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EU VAT Principles as Interpretative 
Aids to EU VAT Rules: 
The Inherent Paradox 
Rita de la Feria 
I. Introduction 
The EU VAT system is founded on two basic principles, namely 
the principle of VAT as a general consumption tax, and the 
principle of fiscal neutrality. Based on key elements of the VAT 
system as it was introduced in the 1960s, they have been both 
developed by the Court as fundamental principles of the system 
over an extended period, spanning almost five decades. Once 
exclusions from the tax base, such as exemptions and reduced 
rates, are introduced, however, these two principles became 
contradictory. This results in a dialectic struggle, whereby a 
choice must be made when interpreting VAT rules on exclusions, 
namely: interpreting these rules in light with the principle of 
VAT as a tax on consumption, and its corollary, the principle of 
strict interpretation, will result in a less neutral system; 
interpreting these rules in line with the principle of fiscal 
neutrality, will result in further erosion of the tax base, and legal 
uncertainty. The paper starts by presenting a typology of 
                                                     
 Professor of Tax Law, University of Leeds, UK. Earlier versions of this paper, 
or sections therein, were presented at conferences/seminars held at Trier 
(March 2013), Leiden (May2015), as well as Vienna (December 2015).  I am 
grateful to the organisers, and for comments received therein. 
 2 
European VAT principles based upon the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU.  It then assesses that jurisprudence insofar as exclusions 
from the tax base are concerned, namely rules on VAT 
exemptions, and rules on VAT reduced rates, highlighting this 
dialectic struggle, and identifying both the Court’s traditional 
stand on it, and its more recent approach. An empirical 
assessment of the hypothesis is then presented, by reviewing a 
five years sample of cases on the interpretation of the scope of 
VAT exemptions, and identifying for each case whether the CJEU 
decided on the basis of the principle of fiscal neutrality, or on the 
basis of the principle of strict interpretation. Whilst not meant to 
be taken as an accurate method of determining the Court’s 
preferences as regards interpretative methods, the exercise 
demonstrates not only a growing preference for fiscal neutrality, 
but also the increasingly casuistic nature of interpreting VAT 
rules on exclusions of the tax base. The paper concludes that 
these tendencies are likely to continue in the face of new 
economic realities, and that the challenge for the CJEU will be to 
reach the right balance between promoting neutrality and 
eliminating distortions, without creating an environment of legal 
uncertainty, which will undermine confidence and economic 
growth. 
II. EU VAT Principles 
The EU VAT system is founded upon two basic principles, namely 
the principle of VAT as a general consumption tax, and the 
principle of fiscal neutrality. Based on key elements of the VAT 
system as it was introduced in the 1960s, they have been both 
developed by the Court as fundamental principles of the system 
over an extended period of nearly five decades. 
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II.1 VAT as General Consumption Tax 
Despite ambiguous terminology VAT is a general tax on 
consumption, and rationale for reference in the Treaties, and 
some earlier legislation to turnover taxes is merely historical.1 
The principle was enshrined in Article 2 of the First VAT 
Directive, which states that ‘the principle of the common system of 
value added tax involves application to goods and services of a 
general tax on consumption’;2 and it has also been consistently 
reiterated by the Court in cases dating back to the early 1980s.3 
In the more recent My Travel, the Court stated: 
‘It is to be remembered that the basic principle of VAT is that it is a 
consumption tax designed to be borne only by the final consumer.’4 
Yet, whilst as general tax on consumption VAT should apply to all 
consumption, the decision was made in the 1960s by the EU 
legislator to exclude some consumption from tax base. The 
rationale for excluding consumption from tax base in 1960s / 
1970s was essentially two-fold, namely: to replicate exclusions 
from tax based applicable under previous cumulative taxes; and 
to reflect the existence of technical obstacles to the application of 
                                                     
1 On VAT as a tax on consumption, see J. Englisch, “VAT/GST and Direct Taxes: 
Different Purposes” in M. Lang, P. Melz, and E. Kristoffersson (eds.), Value 
Added Tax and Direct Taxation – Similarities and Differences (Amsterdam: IBFD, 
2009); and D. Butler, “VAT as a Tax on Consumption: Some Thoughts on the 
Recent Judgement in Parker Hale Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners” 
(2000) British Tax Review 5, 545–553. 
2 First Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of 
legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes, OJ 71, 14/04/1967, p. 
1301. 
3 CJEU, 26 March 1987, Case C-235/85, Commission v Netherlands, 
ECLI:EU:C:1987:161; CJEU, 29 February 1996, Case C-215/94, Mohr, 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:72; and CJEU, 18 December 1997, Case C-384/95, Landboden-
Agrardienste, ECLI:EU:C:1997:627. 
4 CJEU, 6 October 2005, Case C-291/03, My Travel, ECLI:EU:C:2005:591. 
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VAT to some services, the so-called difficult-to-tax services. 
Overtime, three additional explanations were given for the use of 
(merit) exemptions, and reduced rates, namely: 
 Vertical equity: idea that these concessions limit the natural 
regressivity of VAT, i.e. that the tax weights more heavily on 
poorer households; so applying exemptions to key products 
(e.g. food, healthcare, and education) would limit the impact 
of the tax on those households; 
 Positive externalities: idea that these concessions increased 
consumption of so-called merit goods (e.g. books, cultural 
events and sport activities); 
 Increase employment: idea that application of reduced rates 
will ultimately lead to increase employment in labour-
intensive industries (e.g., hairdressing), or areas where price 
is particularly elastic (e.g., electronics), or both (e.g., 
restaurants).5 
These exclusions from the tax base had, however, a very 
significant cost on neutrality. 
II.2 VAT as a Neutral Tax 
Whilst there are various definitions of neutrality,6 generally, a 
neutral tax is one that does not influence commercial decisions. 
                                                     
5 These arguments for exclusions from the tax base are analysed in detail in R. 
de la Feria, “Blueprint for Reform of VAT Rates in Europe” (2015) Intertax 
43(2), 154-171, for rates; and R. de la Feria and R. Krever, “Ending VAT 
Exemptions: Towards A Post-Modern VAT” in R. de la Feria (ed.), VAT 
Exemptions: Consequences and Design Alternatives (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2013), 3-35, for exemptions. 
6 See B. Terra and J. Kajus, A Guide to European VAT Directives 2015, Volume 1 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015). For a new comprehensive study on neutrality, see C. 
Herbain, VAT Neutrality (Lacier, 2015). 
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Taken in that sense, the neutrality of VAT is usually held as one 
of main reasons for its introduction: in Europe this much is made 
clear in the Neumark Report,7 which uses neutrality as the main 
argument for VAT against the - at the time common - use of 
cumulative taxes;8 and worldwide, the spread of VAT to over 150 
countries has been attributed to its technical advantages, most 
notably neutrality.9 
It is therefore unsurprising that the principle of VAT as a neutral 
tax was enshrined in First VAT Directive, and was quickly 
developed by the CJEU as the principle of fiscal neutrality in its 
early case-law. In Hong Kong, one of the Court’s earliest 
judgments on VAT, it stated: 
‘[The Preamble to the First Directive] refers to the need to achieve 
such harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes as will 
eliminate factors which may distort conditions of competition, and 
therefore, to secure neutrality in competition, in the sense that 
within each country similar goods should bear the same tax 
burden, whatever the length of the production and distribution 
chain.’10 
                                                     
7 European Commission, The EEC Reports on Tax Harmonisation – The Report of 
the Fiscal and Financial Committee and the Report of the Sub-Groups A, B and C, 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 1963). 
8 For a detailed analysis of the historical background to the introduction of VAT 
in Europe, see R. de la Feria, The EU VAT System and the Internal Market 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009), at Chapter 2. 
9 K. James, “Exploring the Origins and Global Rise of VAT”, in The VAT Reader 
(Washington DC: Tax Analysts, 2011), 15-22; M. Keen, “VAT Attacks!” (2007) 
International Tax and Public Finance 14, 365–381; S. Cnossen, “Global Trends 
and Issues in Value Added Taxation” (1998) International Tax and Public 
Finance 5(3), 399-428; and M. Keen and B. Lockwood, “The Value-Added Tax: 
its Causes and Consequences” (2010) Journal of Development Economics 92(2), 
138-151. 
10 CJEU, 1 April 1982, Case 89/81, Hong-Kong, ECLI:EU:C:1982:121. 
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II.3 CJEU Typology of Principles 
Alongside the above two fundamental principles of the EU VAT 
system, the CJEU has developed various sub-principles, in 
essence corollaries of the two main principles. The principles of 
VAT uniformity, equality, and elimination of distortions in 
competition, have been developed as corollaries of the principle 
of fiscal neutrality. Although their existence was already 
somewhat implicit in several early cases, where initially in cases 
where the Court concluded that the principle of fiscal neutrality 
precluded Member States from treating lawful and unlawful 
transactions differently for VAT purposes;11 their existence was 
explicitly stated by the Court in Commission v France.12 
Whilst is not always clear how VAT legal principles interact, a 
typology is proposed in Table 1.13 According to this proposed 
typology, the principle of the right to deduct has been developed 
by the Court as both a corollary of the fiscal neutrality principle, 
and of the principle of VAT as a general tax on consumption. The 
principle of fiscal neutrality has another corollary, namely the 
principle of VAT uniformity or equal treatment; and the principle 
of VAT as a general tax on consumption has two corollaries, 
namely the principle of strict interpretation, as developed by the 
Court, and the destination principle, as set out in the Directive. 
                                                     
11 CJEU, 22 September 1988, Case 286/86, Happy Family, ECLI:EU:C:1988:434; 
CJEU, 2 August 1993, Case C-111/92, Lange, ECLI:EU:C:1993:345; and CJEU, 11 
June 1998, Case C-283/95, Fischer, ECLI:EU:C:1998:276. 
12 CJEU, 3 May 2001, Case C-481/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:237. 
13 For an alternative interpretation of how the principles interact, see J. 
Englisch, “VAT and General Principles of EU Law” in D. Weber (ed.), Traditional 
and Alternative Routes to European Tax Integration (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2010), 
Chapter 11. 
 7 
 
Table 1: Typology of EU VAT Principles 
III. Role of Neutrality on Interpretation of 
Exemptions 
The role of the two fundamental principles of the VAT system, 
namely the principle of VAT as a general tax on consumption, 
and the principle of fiscal neutrality, as interpretative aids is 
reflected in the CJEU interpretation of the exemptions’ 
provisions. 
III.1 Traditional Approach 
The initial interpretation by the CJEU of VAT exemptions was 
clearly influenced by the principle of VAT as a tax on 
consumption. Faced with growing number of references from the 
early 1990s onwards, Court quickly developed general 
guidelines on interpretation of exemptions: 
‘The exemptions provided for in [the Directive] are to be 
interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general 
EU VAT 
PRINCIPLES 
FISCAL 
NEUTRALITY 
RIGHT TO DEDUCT 
UNIFORMITY / 
EQUALITY 
GENERAL TAX ON 
CONSUMPTION 
RIGHT TO DEDUCT 
STRICT 
INTERPRETATION 
DESTINATION 
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principle that turnover tax is to be levied on all services supplied 
for consideration by a taxable person.’14 
And so the principle of strict interpretation was born. Other 
interpretative principles were also developed by the CJEU, in 
particular the principle of contextual interpretation,15 and the 
principle of uniform interpretation of exemptions,16 but none 
had the significance, or the impact, of the principle of strict 
interpretation. Indeed, Court’s traditional preference for strict 
interpretation of exemptions was reflected at two levels, namely 
as regards their objective scope, and the type of activities 
covered therein; and their subjective scope, and the type of 
supplies which can be covered by exemption. This double 
                                                     
14 CJEU, 23 February 1988, Case 353/85, Commission v United Kingdom, 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:82; CJEU, 24 May 1988, Case 122/87, Commission v Italy, 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:256; CJEU, 11 August 1995, Case C-453/93, Bulthuis-Griffioen, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:265; CJEU, 20 November 2003, Case C-212/01, Unterpertinger, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:625; and CJEU, 10 June 2010, Case C-86/09, Future Health 
Technologies, ECLI:EU:C:2010:334, all of which regarding the interpretation of 
the exemption applicable to medical services, Article 132(1)(b); CJEU, 12 
November 1998, Case C-149/97, Institute of Motor Industry, 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:536, regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable 
to trade unions, Article 132(1)(l); and CJEU, 18 January 2001, Case C-150/99, 
Stockholm Lindopark, ECLI:EU:C:2001:34, on the interpretation of the 
exemption applicable to sport organizations, Article 132(1)(m). 
15 As mentioned in Kluger, ’exemptions constitute independent concepts of 
Community law which must be placed in the general context of the common 
system of VAT’, see CJEU, 10 September 2002, Case C-141/00, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:473, at para. 29. 
16 As referred in Abbey National, ’exemptions provided for [in the Directive] 
have their own independent meaning in Community law which must be given a 
Community definition whose purpose is to avoid divergences in the application 
of the VAT system from one Member State to the other‘, see CJEU, 4 May 
2006Case C-169/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:289, at para. 38. See also CJEU, 3 March 
2005, Case C-428/02, Fonden Marselisborg Lystbadehavn, ECLI:EU:C:2005:126, 
at para. 27; and CJEU, 1 December 2005, Joined Cases C-394/04 and C-395/04, 
Ygeia, ECLI:EU:C:2005:734, at para. 15. 
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limitation to the scope of – at least some – exemptions was 
reiterated by the Court on various occasions, until recently.17 
This is not to say that strict interpretation was always adhered 
to; on the contrary, the first cases departing from strict 
interpretation date back to the late 1990s. These can be broadly 
divided into two types. The first are cases concerning technical 
exemptions, particularly those applicable to financial services, 
which depart from strict interpretation, but not explicitly based 
on the principle of fiscal neutrality;18 resorting to the principle of 
fiscal neutrality was less necessary in these cases, since the 
wording of the financial services exemptions does not always 
limit their subjective scope, and the cases concerned primarily 
outsourcing and sub-contracting.19 The second type are cases 
concerning merit exemptions, particularly those applied to 
medical activities, which explicitly depart from strict 
interpretation on the basis of the principle of fiscal neutrality;20 
express departure was necessary in these, since the cases 
concerned both type of services, and type of suppliers, and the 
wording of those provisions often limits both their subjective 
and objective scope.21 
                                                     
17 CJEU, 10 June 2010, Case C‐262/08, CopyGene, ECLI:EU:C:2010:328. 
18 CJEU, 5 June 1997, Case C-2/95, SDC, ECLI:EU:C:1997:278; and CJEU, 25 
February 1999, Case C-349/96, CPP, ECLI:EU:C:1999:93. 
19 For a detailed analysis of these cases see R. de la Feria, “The EU VAT 
Treatment of Insurance and Financial Services (Again) Under Review” (2007) 
EC Tax Review 2, 74-89. 
20 CJEU, 7 September 1999, Case C-216/97, Gregg, ECLI:EU:C:1999:390; CJEU, 
11 January 2001, Case C-76/99, Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:2001:12; CJEU, 
20 November 2003, Case C-307/01, d’Ambrumenil, ECLI:EU:C:2003:627; and 
CJEU, 8 June 2006, Case C-106/05, L.u.p., ECLI:EU:C:2006:380. 
21 An analysis of the cases concerning in particular the medical exemptions is 
undertaken in R. de la Feria, “Renúncia à Isenção de IVA por Estabelecimentos 
Hospitalares” (2015) Revista de Finanças Públicas e Direito Fiscal 8(1). 
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Yet, there was a clear sense that the above cases were the 
exception. Indeed there were also numerous examples of cases 
where fiscal neutrality was invoked by the parties as a basis for 
departing from strict interpretation, just to be expressly 
dismissed by the Court.22 Overall the perception was that in the 
hierarchy of interpretative principles, under the traditional 
approach, strict interpretation had won the day. As the economy 
changed, this was however set to change. 
III.2 Strict Interpretation vs. Fiscal Neutrality 
In 2006 the European Commission stated that, the rule according 
to which the interpretation of exemptions must meet the 
requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality was one of only 
three CJEU jurisprudential pillars as regards exemptions.23 At the 
time, there was perhaps an element of wishful thinking to this 
statement, but it is true that by then the seeds of change were 
already being sown. 
The reasons for the Court’s progressive stronger emphasis on 
fiscal neutrality in the interpretation of exemptions appear to be 
two-fold. The first, and perhaps most important, element has 
been the changes in economic reality, and in particular insofar  
as services covered by merit exemptions were concerned, these 
changes were massive. Whilst in 1970s most of these services 
were performed by public entities, now they are also supplied by 
private entities, operating  in market conditions; new services 
have also flooded the market, primarily as regards medical 
activities, and few in 1970s could have envisaged the medical 
                                                     
22 CJEU, 20 November 2003, Case C-8/01, Assurandor-Societetet, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:621. 
23 European Commission, Consultation Paper on Modernising Value Added Tax 
Obligations for Financial Services and Insurances, 2006, at p. 10. 
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developments in the use of steam cells, or cloning. In addition, 
the form in services covered by both merit and technical 
exemptions are now supplied has also fundamentally changed; in 
particular, there is an increased resource to new efficiency-
maximisation economic structures, such as outsourcing, which in 
turn have increased the – already existing – problem of 
irrecoverable input VAT.  The second reason for the Court’s 
stronger emphasis on fiscal neutrality appears to be a simple 
accumulation of knowledge and experience. In the past, it had 
often, and rightly, been accused of over-simplistic approach to 
tax matters, including VAT exemptions. Seen in that light this 
new approach represents a natural jurisprudential evolution, 
witnessed in other areas, whereby there is a move towards a 
more complex, nuanced, interpretation of VAT rules, based on 
general VAT principles. 
Regardless of the rationale, however, the CJEU stronger 
emphasis on fiscal neutrality in the interpretation of exemptions 
has resulted in a lesser emphasis on strict interpretation, and a 
constant dialectic struggle between strict interpretation and 
fiscal neutrality. Why, one may ask? Id est, why is the preference 
for strict interpretation usually accompanied by a dismissal of 
fiscal neutrality, and vice-versa? The answer lies in the nature of 
exemptions; they are inherently non-neutral, they constitute in 
themselves a violation of the principle of fiscal neutrality. This 
inherent paradox has been implicitly acknowledged by the Court, 
and expressly acknowledged by AG Jacobs over a decade ago: 
‘It is inherent in the existence of exceptions to the VAT system that 
they will interfere to some extent with the application of the 
principles of neutrality and of equality treatment. Whatever the 
merits of the decision […], it forms an integral part of the Directive. 
In that in comparable situations, the treatment of taxable persons 
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and persons excluded from the VAT system will inevitably be 
different.’24 
So that, in essence, interpreting exemptions often requires a 
choice between obliging one or the other of the two fundamental 
principles of VAT. Interpreting exemptions in line with principle 
of VAT as general tax on consumption will naturally lead to a 
strict interpretation of those exemptions; interpreting 
exemptions in line with principle of fiscal neutrality may lead to 
a non-strict, even broad, interpretation of those exemptions. 
There are many examples for this recurrent dialectic struggle 
between strict interpretation and fiscal neutrality; cases which, 
on the facts, seemed all too similar, and yet were decided 
differently.25 On the interpretation of exemptions for medical 
services, there is Bulthuis‐Griffioen on side, and Gregg on the 
other;26 as regards the interpretation of the exemption for sports 
activities, Stockholm Lindopark, on one side, and Canterbury 
Hockey.27 Recent decisions in gambling, as well as in fund 
management services, however, are not only further evidence of 
this dialectic struggle, but also of its intensification. 
                                                     
24 CJEU, 2 June 2005, Case C-378/02, Waterschap Zeeuws Vlaanderen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:726, at para. 38. 
25 A struggle first noted by C. Amand in “VAT for Public Entities and Charities – 
Should the Sixth Directive Be Renegotiated?” (2006) International VAT Monitor 
6, 433-443. 
26 CJEU, 11 August 1995, Case C‐453/93, Bulthuis-Griffioen, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:265, and CJEU, 7 September 1999, Case C‐216/97, Gregg, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:390.  See also S. Chirichigno and V. Seggre, “Hospital and 
Medical Care by Commercial Hospitals under EU VAT” (2014) International VAT 
Monitor 2, 78-81. 
27 CJEU, 18 January 2001, Case C-150/99, Stockholm Lindöpark, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:34, and CJEU, 16 October 2008, Case C-253/07, Canterbury 
Hockey, ECLI:EU:C:2008:571.  See also F. Schulyok, “The ECJ’s Interpretation of 
VAT Exemptions” (2010) International VAT Monitor 4, 266-270. 
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In so far as the exemption applicable to gambling services is 
concerned, the CJEU had already stated in various cases that the 
principle of fiscal neutrality limits the level of discretion granted 
to Member States under Article 135(1)(i) of the VAT Directive, in 
particular: fiscal neutrality precludes Member States from 
treating unlawful gambling as taxable, and lawful gambling as 
exempt;28 it precludes Member States from treating private 
gambling as taxable, and lawful gambling as exempt;29 and it 
means that outsourcing and subcontracting of gambling 
activities can still fall within scope of exemption.30 Yet, the an 
interpretation based on the principle of fiscal neutrality was 
dismissed in the recent Leo-Libera case, where the Court held 
that Member States may treat one form of gambling as exempt, 
and another as taxable, as long as they are not in competition 
with each other.31 Less than a year later, this decision was 
followed by what has been regarded as a landmark decision 
insofar as the principle of fiscal neutrality goes: Rank Group.32 
The case established, for the first time, a neutrality test, namely it 
ruled that the different treatment of two supplies of services 
which are: (a) identical or similar from the point of view of the 
consumer and; (b) which meet the same needs of the consumer, 
is sufficient to establish an infringement of the principle of fiscal 
neutrality.33 It has therefore massive implications, not only for 
the interpretation of exemptions, but also, as discussed below, 
for the interpretation of rate provisions. 
                                                     
28 CJEU, 11 June 1998, Case C-283/95, Fischer, ECLI:EU:C:1998:276. 
29 CJEU, 17 February 2005, Case C-453/02, Linneweber, ECLI:EU:C:2005:92. 
30 CJEU, 14 July 2011, Case C-464/10, Henfling and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:489. 
31 CJEU, 10 June 2010, Case C-58/09, Leo-Libera, ECLI:EU:C:2010:333. 
32 CJEU, 10 November 2011, Case C-259/10, Rank Group, ECLI:EU:C:2011:719. 
33 For an analysis of this case, see R. de la Feria “Rank Group. VAT exemption on 
gambling. Principle of fiscal neutrality. Court of Justice” (2012) Highlights & 
Insights on European Taxation 1. 
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So that, in the space of less than two years, there were three CJEU 
decisions as regards the scope of the VAT exemption applicable 
to gambling services. In two of these the Court decided on the 
basis of the principle of fiscal neutrality, and in the other on the 
basis of the principle strict interpretation. 
As regards the exemption applicable to management services of 
special investment funds, it is clear that the principle of fiscal 
neutrality has played a crucial role in determining the scope of 
Article 135(1)(g) of the VAT Directive, in particular: fiscal 
neutrality means that outsourcing and subcontracting of 
activities relating to management services of special investment 
funds can still fall within scope of exemption, as long as they 
form a distinct whole, and are specific to, and essential for, the 
management of those funds;34 and it precludes Member States 
from treating management of open-ended funds as exempt, and 
management of closed-ended funds as taxable.35  Yet the 
application of the principle was dismissed in two recent cases, in 
favour of strict interpretation. It was held that strict 
interpretation precluded Member States from treating portfolio 
management activity as falling within the scope of the 
exemption,36 and from treating investment funds pooling the 
assets of a retirement pension scheme as a “special investment 
fund”, since those funds were not ’sufficiently comparable‘ to be 
regarded in competition with exempt ones.37 In one of these in 
particular, Deutsche Bank, the dismissal of the application of the 
principle of fiscal neutrality was expressly stated by the Court: 
                                                     
34 CJEU, 4 May 2006, Case C-169/04, Abbey National, ECLI:EU:C:2006:289. 
35 CJEU, 28 June 2007, Case C-363/05, JP Morgan, ECLI:EU:C:2007:391. 
36 CJEU, 19 July 2012, Case C-44/11, Deutsche Bank, ECLI:EU:C:2012:484. 
37 CJEU, 7 March 2013, Case C-424/11, Wheels Common Investment Fund, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:144. 
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‘[the principle of fiscal neutrality] cannot extend the scope of an 
exemption in the absence of clear wording to that effect. That 
principle is not a rule of primary law which can condition the 
validity of an exemption, but a principle of interpretation, to be 
applied concurrently with the principle of strict interpretation of 
exemptions’38 
In the same year that it decided on these two cases, however, the 
Court decided on another case concerning the scope of this 
exemption, based on the principle of fiscal neutrality, holding 
that the principle meant that outsourcing of advisory services 
concerning investment in transferable securities still fell within 
its scope.39 So that in the period of approximately one year, it 
decided on the basis of strict interpretation in two cases, and on 
the basis of fiscal neutrality in one other. 
Table 2 presents a recent sample of cases on the interpretation of 
the scope of VAT exemptions, essentially all the cases decided on 
the topic in the last four years. For each case it is identified 
whether the CJEU decided - explicitly or implicitly - on the basis 
of the principle of fiscal neutrality, or on the basis of the principle 
of strict interpretation. 
                                                     
38 At paragraph 45.  For a detailed analysis of this case, see R. de la Feria and C. 
Belim, “IVA nas Transacções Financeiras: Sobre o Tratamento da Gestão de 
Carteiras de Títulos” (2012) Revista de Finanças Públicas e Direito Fiscal 5(4), 
259-276; see also F. Wersand and S. Cazes, “EU VAT and the Conundrum of 
Financial Investments” (2013) International VAT Monitor 2, 83-88. 
39 CJEU, 7 March 2013, Case C-275/11, GfBk, ECLI:EU:C:2013:141. 
CJEU Cases on Interpretation of VAT Exemptions: 
2012- 2015 
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C-436/10 BLM Art. 135(1)(l) Leasing of 
immovable 
property 
Strict 
interpretation 
2012 
C-44/11 Deutsche Bank Art. 135(1)(g) Management of 
special investment 
funds 
Strict 
Interpretation 
2012 
C-174/11 Zimmermann Art. 132(1)(g) Welfare and social 
security work 
Fiscal 
Neutrality 
2012 
C-210/11 Medicom Art. 135(1)(l) Leasing of 
immovable 
property 
Strict 
interpretation 
2013 
C-224/11 BGŻ Leasing Art. 135(1)(a) Insurance services Fiscal 
Neutrality 
2013 
C-259/11 DTZ Zadelhoff Art. 135(1)(f) Dealings in shares Fiscal 
Neutrality 
2012 
C-275/11 GfBk Art. 135(1)(g) Management of 
special investment 
funds 
Fiscal 
Neutrality 
2013 
C-299/11 Gemeente 
Vlaardingen 
Art. 135(1)(k) Building land - 2012 
C-326/11 J.J. Komen en 
Zonen Beheer 
Heerhugowaar
d 
Art. 135(1)(j) Buildings Fiscal 
Neutrality 
2012 
C-392/11 Field Fisher 
Waterhouse 
Art. 135(1)(l) Leasing of 
immovable 
property 
- 2012 
C-424/11 Wheels 
Common 
Investment 
Fund Trustees 
and Others 
Art. 135(1)(g) Management of 
special investment 
funds 
Strict 
Interpretation 
2013 
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C-532/11 Leichenich Art. 135(1)(l) Leasing of 
immovable 
property 
Fiscal 
Neutrality 
2012 
C-543/11 Woningstichtin
g Maasdriel 
Art. 135(1)(k) Building land Strict 
Interpretation 
2013 
C-18/12 Město 
Žamberk 
Art. 
132(1)(m) 
Sporting activities Fiscal 
Neutrality 
2013 
C-26/12 PPG Holdings Art. 135(1)(g) Management of 
special investment 
funds 
Strict 
Interpretation 
2013 
C-91/12 PCF Clinic Art. 132(1)(b) Medical services Fiscal 
Neutrality 
2013 
C-139/12 Caixa 
d'Estalvis i 
Pensions de 
Barcelona 
Art. 135(1)(f) Dealings in shares - 2014 
C-319/12 MDDP Art. 132(1)(i) Education services Fiscal 
Neutrality 
2013 
C-366/12 Klinikum 
Dortmund 
Art. 132(1)(b) Medical services Strict 
Interpretation 
2014 
C-440/12 Metropol 
Spielstätten 
Art. 135(1)(i) Gambling - 2013 
C-461/12 Granton 
Advertising 
Art.135(1)(d) 
and (f) 
Dealings in shares 
Dealings in 
payments 
Strict 
interpretation 
2014 
C-464/12 ATP 
PensionService 
Art.135(1)(d) 
and (g) 
Dealings in 
payments 
Management of 
special investment 
funds 
Fiscal 
Neutrality 
2014 
C-495/12 Bridport and 
West Dorset 
Art. 
132(1)(m) 
Sporting activities Fiscal 
Neutrality 
2013 
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Table 2: Four Years’ Sample of CJEU Cases on VAT Exemptions 
Making a breakdown of these thirty cases, according to the 
interpretative method adopted, the result is as follows: in four 
cases the CJEU did not decide either on the basis of fiscal 
neutrality, or of strict interpretation;40 in approximately half the 
analysed cases the Court interpreted the scope of the 
                                                     
40 CJEU, 8 November 2012, Case C-299/11, Gemeente Vlaardingen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:698; CJEU, 27 September 2012, Case C-392/11, Field Fisher 
Waterhouse. ECLI:EU:C:2012:597; CJEU, 24 October 2013, Case C-440/12 
Metropol Spielstätten, ECLI:EU:C:2013:687; and CJEU, 20 March 2014, Case C-
139/12, Caixa d'Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona, ECLI:EU:C:2014:174. 
Golf Club 
C-584/13 Mapfre 
asistencia and 
Mapfre 
warranty 
Art. 135(1)(a) Insurance services Fiscal 
Neutrality 
2015 
C-594/13 «go fair» 
Zeitarbeit 
Art. 132(1)(g) Welfare and social 
security work 
Strict 
interpretation 
2015 
C-595/13 Fiscale 
Eenheid X 
Art. 135(1)(g) Management of 
special investment 
funds 
Fiscal 
neutrality 
2015 
C-55/14 Régie 
communale 
autonome du 
stade Luc 
Varenne 
Art. 135(1)(l) Leasing of 
immovable 
property 
Strict 
interpretation 
2015 
C-114/14 Commission v 
Sweden 
Articles 
132(1)(a) 
Postal services Fiscal 
neutrality 
2015 
C-264/14 Hedqvist Art.135(1)(e) Dealings in 
currency 
Fiscal 
neutrality 
2015 
C-334/14 De Fruytier Art. 132(1)(b) 
and (c) 
Medical services Strict 
interpretation 
2015 
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exemptions, explicitly or implicitly, in line with fiscal neutrality: 
in four out of eight cases in 2012; in six out of eleven in 2013; in 
one out of four in 2014; and in four out of seven in 2015Diagram 
1 below provides an annual breakdown of the number of VAT 
exemptions cases decided on the basis of fiscal neutrality, when 
compared to the overall number of cases on exemptions. 
 
Diagram 1: Breakdown of VAT Exemptions Cases Decided on the Basis of the 
Fiscal Neutrality Principle 
Whilst of course not meant to be taken as an accurate method of 
determining the Court’s preferences as regards interpretative 
methods, this rough analysis does highlight not only a growing 
preference for fiscal neutrality, but also the increasingly casuistic 
nature of interpreting VAT exemptions. Indeed, whilst a 
propensity can be identified as regards some of the exemptions 
for either strict interpretation or fiscal neutrality – for example 
the Court appears to be more likely to adopt a strict 
interpretation of immovable property exemptions – it is also 
clearly the case that there is no exemption rule which has been 
interpreted exclusively on the basis of strict interpretation, or 
exclusively on the basis of fiscal neutrality.   
0
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Total VAT Cases
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Similar tendencies can also be observed, albeit to a lesser extent 
given the lower numbers, in cases concerning the interpretation 
of rates’ provisions. 
IV. Role of Neutrality on Interpretation of Rates 
The acknowledgement by the Court of the role of fiscal 
neutrality, and of VAT uniformity or equal treatment as its 
corollary, in the interpretation of VAT rates, was a more recent 
development than the similar acknowledgement in the field of 
exemptions. Indeed, the first time its interpretative role was 
recognised was in Commission v France, a case dating back to the 
late 1990s.41 
IV.1 Fiscal Neutrality Criteria 
It resulted from that case also that, the criterion used to 
determine whether or not a dissimilar VAT treatment violated 
the principle of fiscal neutrality seemed to have been whether 
the goods in question were or not in competition with each 
other, as follows: 
‘It is clear that, in introducing and maintaining in force a VAT rate 
of 2.1% solely for reimbursable medical products, the French 
legislation did not, and does not infringe the principle of fiscal 
neutrality.  Reimbursable and non-reimbursable medical products 
are not similar products in competition with each other […] Once 
included in the list of reimbursable products, a medical product 
                                                     
41 CJEU, 3 May 2001, Case C-481/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:237. 
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will, vis-à-vis a non-reimbursable medical product, have a decisive 
advantage for the final consumer’42 
This emphasis on the competing, or non-competing, nature of the 
products in question was again reiterated in Commission v 
Netherlands, where the Court stated that the categories of 
product in question ‘are not in competition, meaning that they can 
be subject to different rates of VAT’.43 So that, as opposed to what 
the Court seems to be suggesting in its decision in Rank Group,44 
until that decision the criterion used to determine whether or 
not different VAT treatments of two products violated the 
principle of fiscal neutrality was in essence whether the goods in 
question were or not in competition with each other. 
In Rank Group the CJEU revised this approach in a decision that 
would emerge as a key development for the principle of fiscal 
neutrality.45 In it, the Court, relying upon an old judgment 
concerning excise duties,46 sets-out a two-part test for 
establishing whether or not there is an infringement of fiscal 
neutrality, namely whether the products being treated 
differently for VAT purposes are comparable from point of view 
of the customer, and meet the same customers’ needs. 
Whilst the decision concerned exemptions,47 it was as regards 
the application of rates that the establishment of the neutrality 
                                                     
42 Ibid, at paragraphs 25 and 27. 
43 CJEU, 3 March 2011, Case C-41/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:108, at paragraph 66.  
For a deeper analysis of these cases see R. de la Feria, n. 8 above, at Chapter 4. 
44 CJEU, 10 November 2011, Case C-259/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:719. 
45 For a more detailed analysis of the impact of this case, see R de la Feria, “VAT: 
A New Dawn for the Principle of Fiscal Neutrality?” (2011) Oxford University 
Centre for Business Taxation Policy Paper. 
46 CJEU, 11 August 1995, Joint Cases C-367/93 to C-377/93, Roders and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:261, paragraph 27. 
47 See point II.B. above. 
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test had an immediate impact. Indeed, in the immediate 
aftermath of the decision some were quick to point out that that 
it was ‘highly likely’ that the criteria laid down in Rank Group 
would affect the application of VAT rates particularly to food, and 
that ‘the entire fabric of the manner in which VAT is applied to 
food’ would have to be re-examined.48 The proposition seemed 
even more convincing in the context of another decision of the 
CJEU that same year concerning the interpretation of the term 
’foodstuff’ in the Directive: Bog, where the Court,49 without ever 
referring to fiscal neutrality, clearly departed from strict 
interpretation of exceptions to the general rule, by adopting a 
broad meaning of that term.   
With these two decisions in the same year, reliance on fiscal 
neutrality appeared clearly on the rise, but this perception was 
short-lived. 
IV.2 Strict interpretation vs. Fiscal Neutrality 
In the last year a number of high profile cases on the application 
of reduced rates arrived to the CJEU raising the debate as to 
whether the Court would apply (or not) the new criteria for fiscal 
neutrality, as set out in Rank Group, to these cases. At stake in all 
of them was the interpretation of the word ‘books’, and whether 
the provision in the VAT Directive which allows ‘books’ to be 
subject to a reduced rate of VAT should be extended to similar 
products which did not exist at the time the Directive was 
approved, namely audio books, and e-books. 
                                                     
48 V. Sloane, “VAT Focus – Rank and Fiscal Neutrality” (2011) Tax Journal 1101, 
20, 18 November 2011. 
49 CJEU, 10 March 2011, Case C-497/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:135. 
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The cases therefore represented the perfect opportunity to test, 
not only the applicability of the new criteria set out in Rank 
Group– was it to be confirmed as the new standard for fiscal 
neutrality? – but importantly also, to test the strength of fiscal 
neutrality itself, now that a test was available.50 The first 
question was clearly answered: in all cases the Court reiterated 
the Rank Group test, confirming it as the criteria for establishing 
potential infringements of the principle fiscal neutrality. As 
regards the second aspect, however, namely the strength of the 
principle itself, this was considerably less clear. 
In the first of this group of cases concerning non-physical books, 
and namely audio books, the (3rd Chamber of the) CJEU left the 
decision to the national court on whether applying a VAT 
reduced rate to – hardcopy – books, but not to audio books, 
violated the principle of fiscal neutrality, as follows: 
‘it is for the referring court to ascertain […] whether books 
published in paper form and books published on other physical 
supports are goods which are liable to be regarded by the average 
consumer as similar. For that purpose, it will have to assess 
whether those books have similar characteristics and meet the 
same needs, using the criterion of whether their use is comparable, 
in order to ascertain whether or not the differences between them 
                                                     
50 It is common for a legal principle to gain strength once a test is established; 
the most clear example of this dynamic is the prominence gained by the 
principle of prohibition of abuse of law, once a test was established in Halifax, 
even though arguably it already existed before that case, see R. de la Feria, 
“Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law – The Creation of a New General 
Principle of EC Law Through Tax” (2008) Common Market Law Review 45(2), 
395-441. 
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have a significant or tangible influence on the average consumer’s 
decision to choose one or other of those books’51 
Yet, barely six months later, in two other decisions on the same 
theme, the (4th Chamber of the) Court, whilst reiterating the Rank 
Group test, ruled that the principle of fiscal neutrality cannot 
extend the scope of reduced rates of VAT to the supply of 
electronic books.52 How to explain these apparently opposing 
decisions? Apart from the potential impact of the practical 
dynamics of having similar cases being decided by different 
chambers, the only (acceptable) legal answer is that the 
difference results from the ongoing dialectics between the 
principle of strict interpretation, and the principle of fiscal 
neutrality. 
V. Concluding Remarks: Centrality of 
Neutrality for Future Debates 
The rules concerning exclusions from the VAT base, namely 
exemptions and rates, date in their majority to the introduction 
of the European VAT system. A changing, globalised, economy 
requires adapting those, unavoidably outdated provisions to new 
economic realities. Against this background, the CJEU response 
has been an increased reliance on general principles of the VAT 
system, and in particular the principle of fiscal neutrality, as 
interpretative aids. 
                                                     
51 CJEU, 11 September 2014, Case C-219/13, K Oy, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2207, at 
paragraph 31, our underline. 
52 CJEU, 5 March 2015, Case C-479/13, Commission v France, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:141; and CJEU, 5 March 2015, Case C-502/13, Commission v 
Luxembourg, ECLI:EU:C:2015:143. 
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This growing tendency is certainly praise-worthy: not only does 
it represent a more sophisticated approach to the legal 
interpretation of rules excluding specific goods and services 
from the tax base; but, in the absence of political will to remove 
those exclusions, it assists in the construction of the least 
distortive, more neutral, system possible in the presence of 
exclusions. However, it does also present significant challenges. 
Indeed, the inherent paradox between the two fundamental 
principles of the European VAT system, namely that of VAT as 
tax on consumption and that of fiscal neutrality, means in 
practice that the CJEU is faced with a very difficult choice. In 
essence, as set out in Table 3, the more neutral the system is, the 
more uncertain it is also, and the bigger the erosion of the tax 
base. 
The Principle of Fiscal Neutrality as an Interpretative Aid 
Advantages Challenges 
 Fiscal neutrality 
demonstrates a more 
sophisticated approach to 
interpretation of 
exemptions than pure strict 
interpretation. 
 Fiscal neutrality generally 
results in less distortive, 
more neutral, system. 
 Strict interpretation had 
advantage of certainty; decisions 
of the CJEU on have become 
more unpredictable, based on 
casuistic analysis (strict 
interpretation vs fiscal 
neutrality), which undermines 
legal certainty. 
 Further erosion of the tax base. 
Table 3: Advantages and Disadvantages of Interpretation Based on Fiscal 
Neutrality 
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Of course this dialectic struggle between strict interpretation and 
fiscal neutrality is reminiscent of a much wider legal dialectic, 
namely that between security and fairness. As such, the challenge 
for the CJEU is in essnce similar to that faced by many courts 
worldwide, namely to reach the right balance; the right balance 
between promoting neutrality and eliminating distortions, 
without creating an environment of uncertainty, which will 
undermine confidence and impede economic growth. For 
taxpayers this too will represent a challenge, namely that of 
adapting to the casuistic nature of Court’s decisions in the areas 
of exemptions and rates, and to naturally embrace – at least to 
some extent – the uncertainty that comes with it. 
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